



The Artillery S2— Passing the Commander's “So What?” Test

by Captain Ralph A. Patelli, MI

If you were to ask what areas battalion S2s have the greatest difficulty with at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, the answer would overwhelmingly be the process known as the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). (See the article “The Artillery S2’s Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” in this edition.) If you were to ask what the next greatest problem area for S2s is, the answer would be analysis and reporting procedures.

The irony is that these two areas are cornerstone capabilities of any intelligence section, at any unit, at any level. For the Field Artillery, these two capabilities significantly impact targeting—the ability to use fires effectively to support the commander’s intent.

The analysis and reporting challenge for many is to participate in a process that’s probably the least scientific and most artistic of any of the intelligence procedures. Analysis and reporting isn’t scien-

tific because it requires the S2 to think abstractly—there are no formulas or tables to which you can refer for the answer. You must truly *see* the battlefield, *see* your own forces and *see* the enemy. Then you must tell the commander what’s *going* to happen—answer his “So what?” test.

This article briefly outlines a procedure to help the artillery S2 pass the commander’s test. It tells how to prepare an enemy critical events template, helping you predict what the enemy will do with enough lead time to be proactive.


The Intel Section Challenge

The purpose of any intelligence section is to coordinate the acquisition, analyses and reporting of intelligence information to the commander. We have a vehicle that helps the commander focus these efforts. They are called priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). These questions focus the efforts to identify and fill in critical information gaps so the commander and his staff can execute that portion of the operation.

In many intelligence sections, the press of collecting, posting and organizing combat information overwhelms the section to the point it forgets that the “output,” reporting the critical information, is the bottom line. Invariably, the result is that by the time the intelligence section reports information to those who need it, it’s either history or what is happening now—not in the future. Intelligence, by definition, must be predictive. It must expose to the consumer what the enemy’s intentions, vulnerabilities and strengths are and, based on that information, what will happen.

In some sections, it’s not collecting and posting information that’s the problem but deciding what’s important to the consumer. So the section reports everything, filling the airways with information that’s either trivial or lost to the listener.

We have vehicles to tell the consumer what’s going on—to help us decide what’s important. We use pre-formatted reports, intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and periodic intelligence reports, called (PERINTREPs). The INTSUM is published on a scheduled basis (for example, every four to six hours), and PERINTREPs are sent out when significant enemy activity warrants an update. Both these reports have one thing in common: each assesses or concludes what the enemy



No	PIR/IR/CFST/DP	Enemy Event	Target No. NAI/TAI	Actions/Reports Required
1	Fire FASCAM @ Bde obstacle.	Enemy CRP at NAI 4, MRR 45 min from Bde obstacle.	AG0002, NAI 3	Alert FSCOORD, S3, FDO, Bde FSO; send PERINTREP to Bn.
2	Will enemy use chem on BP?	Enemy Phase II/III fires on BP.	NAI 4	Alert FSCOORD, FSOs; check RDO; warn chemo and Bn.
3	Mass the Bn on lead MRB.	Lead MRB @ PL Doom (10 min from target area).	AX0001, NAI 5	Alert FSCOORD, S3, FDO, Bde FSO; send out PERINTREP.
4	Mass the Bn on the enemy's RAG.	Beginning of Phase II fires (CRPs within visual range of BP).	CRP @ NAI 4	CFFZ 1 in effect? Who is available to mass? Can Div Arty help?
5	When will the firing batteries be in jeopardy from enemy direct fire?	1st echelon MRB begin to breach the southern comp BP (45 min warn).	TF FPF, AJ0001	Alert the FSCOORD, S3, battery commanders; send out PERINTREP.

Legend:

Bde = Brigade
 Bn = Battalion
 BP = Battle Position
 CFST = Critical Fire Support Task
 CFFZ = Call-for-Fire Zone
 CRP = Combat Reconnaissance Patrol

DP = Decision Point
 FASCAM = Family of Scatterable Mines
 FDO = Fire Direction Officer
 FSCOORD = Fire Support Coordinator
 FSO = Fire Support Officer
 IR = Intelligence Requirement
 MRB = Motorized Rifle Battalion
 MRR = Motorized Rifle Regiment

NAI = Named Area of Interest
 PERINREPs = Periodic Intelligence Reports
 RAG = Regimental Artillery Group
 RDO = Radar Deployment Order
 PIR = Priority Intelligence Requirement
 PL = Phase Line
 TAI = Targeted Area of Interest
 TF FPF = Task Force Final Protective Fires

will be doing "x" hours from now. This verifies for the commander and staff that their course of action (COA) is good, needs adjustment or needs to be scrapped.

What is absent from many S2 sections is the mechanism to perform this critical analysis and reporting, to glean the right information in a timely manner. The system to help the artillery S2 organize incoming intelligence and report only the enemy activities that would affect friendly plans is the enemy critical events matrix. You build the matrix on the bottom of the events template (see the figure on Page 40).

Before your intelligence section can complete such a matrix, it must have basic equipment and knowledge. First, it must have the appropriate intelligence field manuals (FMs). Next, it must understand the IPB process and have well-organized and informative map boards and graphics. Third, it must understand and be able to execute its mission training plan (MTP) tasks. And last, it must clearly understand the commander's PIRs as well as the critical fire support tasks (CFSTs).

The Enemy Critical Events Matrix

The key overlays intelligence sections must meticulously manage are the enemy situation map (SITMAP) and the events template. The SITMAP is how you track the various reports flowing into the section.

The events template is the overlay that illustrates the timed-phased analysis of the enemy's COAs. This overlay is where you identify the named areas of interest (NAIs), targeted areas of interest (TAIs) and various lines indicating how long it will take the enemy to move from one area of operations to another. Normally, decision points (DPs) from a synchroni-

zation matrix or decision support template (DST) are placed on this overlay to track critical decisions the commander must make.

You build an enemy critical events matrix on the bottom portion of the events template and use it as a guide to tell you what intelligence information is important and when (or if) you must report it to whom. On the bottom unused portion of the events template, draw a rectangle with five columns as shown in the figure. Then insert the following information into the five columns.

- **Item Number.** This column lists a number for each event in the next column. (You write these numbers on the overlay to indicate the location of the events.)

- **PIR/CFST/DP.** In this column, name the PIRs and (or) IRs, CFSTs and DPs in chronological order.

- **Enemy Events.** The enemy action that triggers an answer to each PIR or IR goes in this column. This information warns the chain of command early enough to make a decision at a DP or execute a CFST and other critical events.

- **Target Number.** In this column, you match the battalion target number to the appropriate enemy event. (Some rows in this column will be blank.)

- **Actions/Reports.** This column is where you indicate what to do when each critical enemy event occurs. It ensures that everyone in the section knows who needs that information. The column also can direct reports be generated and tell who needs to receive them.

After the matrix is complete, on either the SITMAP or the event template, you place a symbol with a number that corresponds to those in the first column of your matrix. (In the figure, each is circled on the events template and then numbered to

match the first column.) When positioning the symbol on the map, ensure it's far enough back from the enemy's progression on the map—allows enough time before the actual event—so the section can inform the commander, S3, fire support officer (FSO) or fire direction officer (FDO) and still leave him time to be proactive. For example, if it takes the battalion 30 minutes to employ a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) minefield in the target area, your symbol, the trigger, must be placed on the map 30 minutes back from the enemy's arrival at the target area.

While tracking the battle and confirming and denying your predicted enemy COA, the matrix will focus your reporting efforts and anticipate what critical information your consumers need next. So when you report the information gathered on your enemy critical events matrix, you know the information is important and predictive—useful to the commander and his staff. You know that information will satisfy the commander's "So what?" test.



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New Targeting FM Coming

The new FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14 *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for the Targeting Process* is due to be distributed in April 1996. You must ensure your publications account is current to receive it.

The new FM is a significantly improved, comprehensive and usable manual. It focuses on TTP for the *decide, detect,*

deliver and assess (D³A) targeting methodology for the task force through joint operations at the corps level. The manual is compatible with Army warfighting doctrine and consistent with joint and combined arms doctrine.

Based on the amount of input and participation in the development process by many individuals, units from the field, all the Training and Doctrine Com-

mand (TRADOC) schools and the other services, this new manual is an authoritative, comprehensive targeting reference.



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